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Abstract
I propose an analysis of the particles no, ka,
yo, and ne as speech act modifiers, account-
ing for the readings of falling interrogatives
with and without particles by predicting what
they convey about the speaker’s belief revision
and formation process. The analysis is set in
a CCP-framework formalizing utterance felic-
ity in terms of belief and evidence conditions
in which speech act felicity is compositionally
derived from illocutionary force, sentence fi-
nal intonation, and modification by particles.
1 Japanese sentence final particles
Sentence final particles (SFPs) are a highly produc-
tive class of expressives1 in Japanese. The empirical
scope of this paper are the interrogative marker ka
and the particles no, yo, and ne . While there is only
a consensus to classify yo and ne as SPFs, I analyze
all four particles as SFPs in the sense of speech act
modifiers occurring in the sentential periphery.
SFPs in the Japanese clause Japanese is a strictly
left-branching language, hence elements further
right in linear order generally scope syntactically
higher and enter the semantic derivation later than
such further left. Therefore, layered clause models
have been proposed in descriptive Japanese gram-
mar.2 Minami (1974), for instance, locates SFPs
in the outermost layer of the clause, which encodes
meta-information on the transmission of information
1In the sense of not contributing truth-conditional meaning.
2cf. Narrog (2009) for extensive discussion of various lay-
ered models, Davis (2011) for discussion pertaining to SFPs.
by the utterance. Minami’s next inner layer hosts the
interrogative particle ka and the speech act modal3
daroo, which encode information on the speaker’s
judgment of the truth of the prejacent. The position
of daroo is immediately preceded by that of no4 in
linear order, which in turn is preceded by tense mor-
phology, as (1) below illustrates.
(1) V-T-no-(daroo)-ka-yo-ne
SFPs as speech-act modifiers In line with the in-
tuitions and observations motivating layered clause
models, I propose that no, daroo and ka modify ut-
terance felicity conditions w.r.t. speaker belief and
available evidence (subjective, related to speaker
judgment), yo and ne w.r.t. speaker assumptions on
addressee belief (intersubjective, related to informa-
tion sharing/transmission). On my analysis, all thus
modify utterance meaning on the speech act level
where felicity is computed. As analyzing speech
act felicity is independently necessary to account for
bare (particle-less) utterances, this is a relatively par-
simonious way of accounting for the contribution of
Japanese sentence final expressives.
2 Japanese falling interrogatives
Falling interrogatives (FIs) occur frequently in
Japanese and have uses clearly distinct form canoni-
cal, information-seeking questions. In the remainder
of this section, I introduce the observations to be ac-
counted for in the analysis.
3cf. Hara and Davis (2013), Rieser (2017c) for analysis as a
speech act modifier operating on a Gricean quality threshold.
4cf. Rieser (2017a) for discussion on the structural and func-
tional distinction with the homophonous complementizer no.
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2.1 Two readings of FIs and no
Davis (2011) observes a contrast in felicity between
(2) with and wihtout no under the scenarios in (3).
(2) Tori-ga
birds-NOM
konna
such a
tokoro-ni
place-in
sum-eru
live-POT
(no)
no
ka.
ka
“Can birds live in a place like this!?”/
“Birds can live in a place like this after all!”
(3) a. Scenario 1: S assumes birds cannot live
here, but looking out the window is sur-
prised to discover that in fact they do. She
utters (2) to indicate her surprise.
b. Scenario 2: S believes that birds cannot live
here. Her friend says something that sug-
gests they do. She utters (2) to indicate that
her friend is mistaken.
In Scenario 1, the no-FI is preferred; in Scenario 2,
only the bare FI is felicitous. Davis labels the salient
reading under Scenario 2 the rhetorical question
reading, similar to English rhetorical polar questions
as the first translation indicates. He argues that such
a reading is incompatible with no due to its eviden-
tial properties (which I also assume in my analysis).
I label the salient interpretation under Scenario 1
the incredulity reading,5 that under Scenario 2 the
doubt reading. In Scenario 1, the speaker revises a
previous belief in light of new evidence supporting
the prejacent, while in Scenario 2 the speaker rejects
the prejacent as it is incompatible with a previous
belief. The incredulity reading thus indicates that
evidence-based belief revision is underway and the
previous belief is to be discarded, the prejacent rep-
resenting the revised belief to replace the previous
belief. The doubt reading, on the other hand, indi-
cates no belief revision takes place and the previous
belief is to be retained, the prejacent representing an
unaccepted belief.6
In this way, (no-)FIs convey information about
the speaker’s belief revision and formation proc-
cess, i.e. judgment process w.r.t. the prejacent. I pro-
pose that this encoded in utterance felicity condi-
tions characterizing admissible utterance contexts.
5Thus labeled as it intuitively conveys that the speaker finds
the prejacent “hard to believe” or “unbelievable”.
6It should be noted that in many cases, in particular solilo-
quous uses, the doubt reading conveys suspension of judgment
rather than outright rejection of the prejacent.
2.2 Incredulity, doubt and yo in FIs
Davis further observes that yo-FIs disallow what I la-
bel doubt readings and must be interpreted as asser-
tions (note that I defend distinguishing assertions as
falling declaratives from FIs). Consider (4) showing
a yo-FI with and without no, adapted from Davis’
data by Taniguchi (2016).
(4) Sonna
such
mono
thing
taberu
eat
(no)
no
ka
ka
yo.
yo
“What the hell! He isn’t going to eat that!”/
“Holy shit! He’s going to eat that!”
Taniguchi observes that (4) conveys “negative bias”
(the speaker tends not to believe the preajcent) with-
out no, but “positive bias” (the speaker tends to be-
lieve the preajcent) with no, as the translations sug-
gest. While (4) without no conveys stronger doubt,
both versions of the yo-FI are incredulity readings
in my terminology as they indicate that the speaker
at least considers revising a previous belief, in con-
trast to the bare FI in (2) which receives a doubt
reading. Taniguchi proposes analyzing ka-yo utter-
ances as update with a self-addressed question (ka)
followed by self-corrective update (yo) to derive the
communicative effect of yo-FIs.
I propose an alternative, compositional deriva-
tion of what FIs with particles mean from the ef-
fects that ka, yo, and no have on speech act felicity.
This accounts for Davis’s observation that yo-FIs are
assertion-like as yo introduces (addressee) commit-
ment like (rising) declaratives, and for Taniguchi’s
observations on bias, as no requires evidence in prin-
ciple sufficient for felicitous assertion, indicating
that belief revision is well underway.
2.3 Reluctant acceptance and ne
FIs with ne convey speaker doubt and seek an eval-
uation of the prejacent from the addressee, as in (5).
(5) Sonna
such
mono
thing
taberu
eat
(no)
no
ka
ka
ne.
ne
“So is he actually going to eat this?”/
“So he is actually going to eat this. . . ”
The salient reading of the ne-FI in (5) without no
is a doubt reading, in contrast to the yo-FI in (4),
which even without no receives an incredulity read-
ing. Adding no to (5) makes an incredulity reading
available which in contrast with the mirative nuance
26
of (4) conveys what I label “reluctant acceptance” —
that the speaker is at least considering to also accept
the preajcent. Crucially, as suggested by the trans-
lations with “so” referring to a previous utterance of
the addressee, ne-FIs convey a speaker assumption
that the addressee believes the prejacent to be true.
I propose a compositional account of ne-FIs on
which ka conveys speaker doubt, ne the assumption
that the addressee believe the prejacent, which pre-
dicts that they occur in situations where there is a
discrepancy between speaker and addressee belief.
3 Framework for speech act felicity
While the framework sketched below also covers
handling rising interrogatives (canonical questions)
and rising declaratives,7 I focus on FIs to account for
the observations above. The framework builds on
the following assumptions: (i) Speaker commitment
from assertion can be derived from satisfaction of
Gricean quality maxims; (ii) in interrogatives, qual-
ity requires the speaker to not believe the prejacent
to be true; (iii) FIs convey that the speaker forgoes
commitment to the prejacent. In the remainder of
this section, I define belief and evidence proposi-
tions as the basis to formalize felicity conditions,
provide definitions for the CCP model, and imple-
ment the assumptions in (i) through (iii) above.
3.1 Belief and evidence in speech acts
Felicity conditions are captured in form of belief and
evidence propositions. First, belief propositions of
the formBwx ϕ are defined by doxastic accessibility:
8
(6) a. Bwx ϕ → ∀w′.wRdoxx w′ : w′ ∈Wϕ
b. ¬Bwx ϕ → ∃w′.wRdoxx w′ : w′ 6∈Wϕ
c. Bwx ¬ϕ→ ∀w′.wRdoxx w′ : w′ 6∈Wϕ
Thus, “x believes ϕ to be true at w” (Bwx ϕ) means
that at all worlds compatible with x’s beliefs at w,
ϕ is true ; “x does not believe ϕ to be true at w”
(¬Bwx ϕ) means that at least at one world compatible
with x’s beliefs at w, ϕ is false, and “x believes ϕ to
be false atw” (Bwx ¬ϕ) means that at no worlds com-
patible with x’s beliefs at w at which ϕ is true (ϕ is
false at all worlds compatible with x’s beliefs at w).
7For details, in particular regarding no, see Rieser (2017a).
8The notation for accessibility relations follows Kaufman et
al. (2006). Wϕ is the set of worlds at which ϕ is true, W¬ϕ the
set of worlds at which ϕ is false, and w /∈Wϕ → w ∈W¬ϕ.
Additional assumptions such as circumstantial and
stereotypical conversational backgrounds are taken
to be encoded in Rdox for simplicity, as this issue is
not central to the analysis.
Second, evidence propositions are defined in
terms of evidence required to back up speaker com-
mitment arising from felicitous assertion. The ques-
tion of what constitutes evidence in natural language
is very complex9 and I set it aside here. Focusing on
evidence-related felicity condition on assertion, I de-
fine evidence propositions of the form EV wx ϕ rela-
tive to belief propositions in the following defeasible
entailment relation.10
(7) a. EV wx ϕ > B
w
x ϕ
b. (EV wx ϕ > B
w
x ϕ) ∧ EV wx ϕ ` Bwx ϕ
c. (EV wx ϕ > B
w
x ϕ) ∧Bwx ¬ϕ 0 Bwx ϕ
Thus, from the premise that x has evidence support-
ing ϕ at w one can infer by (7-a) that x believes ϕ at
w as in (7-b), unless there is an additional premise
that x believes ϕ to be false at w as shown in (7-c).
Finally, I define the notion of public belief as in
(8-a) to capture commitment that arises from asser-
tion. Gunlogson (2003) and Davis (2011) employ
the similar notion of public commitment, which dif-
fers in that I take public belief to be independent of
private belief, i.e. an agent can publicly believe ϕ,
but privately not believe ϕ. Furthermore, public be-
lief is recursive as defined in (8-b).
(8) a. PBwx ϕ→ Bwy Bwx ϕ
b. PBwx ϕ→ PBwy Bwx ϕ
Thus, when ϕ is a public belief of x, all other par-
ticipants (here: only y, as I assume two participants
x and y for simplicity) thus believe that x believes
ϕ. The additional stipulation in (8-b) states that
other participants’ beliefs as of (8-a) are also pub-
lic beliefs. This is to distinguish cases of incidental
shared belief from those of public belief arising from
observable linguistic (or other) behavior, i.e. from
“manifest events” in the sense of Stalnaker (2002).11
9cf. McCready (2014) for discussion pertinent to Japanese.
10As defined by Asher and Lascarides (2003).
11In parallel to (8-b), I define mutual introspection in
Rieser (2017b), to account for the publicity-sensitivity of the
German particles doch and ja wich are e.g. not felicitous in as-
sertions that function to publicly announce the prejacent.
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3.2 CCPs, input and output conditions
I use the following definitions in the CCP-model:
U . . . utterance (DEC or INT with ↓ or ↑)
c. . . input context (world before utterance)
c′. . . output context (world after utterance)
BU . . . set of belief conditions U imposes on c
EU . . . set of evidence conditions U imposes on c
PBU . . . set of public beliefs that arise from U
(i.e. set of belief propositions added in c′)
(9) shows the CCP of an utterance U(ϕ).12
(9) JU(ϕ)K = {〈c, c′〉 ∣∣
BU ⊆ c ∧ EU ⊆ c ∧ c′ = c ∪ PBU}
An utterance U is thus a set of pairs of admissible
input and output contexts, and is felicitous iff for the
world w at utterance time (the set of true proposi-
tions) ∃c ∈ 〈c, c′〉 ∈ U : c ⊂ w holds, i.e. all be-
lief and evidence propositions in an admissible in-
put context c are true at utterance time (thus w itself
is an admissible context). Admissible input contexts
c must contain the members of BU and EU , output
contexts c′ those and the members of PBU .
To represent conditions on input contexts (felicity
conditions) and on output contexts (commitments)
in a more compact notation for ease of exposition,
I henceforth also write Bcxϕ for Bxϕ ∈ BU , EV cxϕ
for EVxϕ ∈ EU , and PBc′x ϕ for PBx ∈ PBU .
3.3 Felicity conditions of assertions and FIs
I derive input conditions on falling declaratives from
the two Gricean maxims of quality (Grice, 1975).
QI Do not say anything you believe to be false.
QII Do not say anything for which you lack
adequate evidence.
QI states that the speaker may not believe ¬ϕ in c,
that is ¬BcS¬ϕ, and must have evidence sufficient to
assert ϕ in c, that is EV cSϕ.
(i) Commitment from assertion The evidence
rule connects the two maxims of quality by the in-
ference shown in (10) repeated from (7-b).
12I build on Davis’ (2011) relational CCPs as sets of input /
output context pairs, with the difference that I assume that there
is a unique output context for each admissible input context.
(10) (EV wx ϕ > B
w
x ϕ) ∧ EV wx ϕ ` Bwx ϕ
Satisfaction of EV cSϕ (QI) ensures that the premise
EV wS ϕ is met, and satisfaction of ¬BcS¬ϕ (QII)
rules out that the blocking condition BwS ¬ϕ applies
— thus, the inference in (10) goes through if an an
assertion of ϕ by S is observed and judged felici-
tous, and the observer must assume that BwS ϕ holds.
Thus, commitment from assertion arises as PBc
′
S ϕ.
(11) shows an according falling declarative CCP.
(11) JDEC(ϕ)↓K = {〈c, c′〉 ∣∣
¬BcS¬ϕ ∧ EV cSϕ ∧ PBc
′
S ϕ}
Assertion thus changes the context successfully if
for utterance time w, ¬BwS ¬ϕ and EV wS ϕ hold,
i.e.w is an admissible input context c. The assertion
then gives rise to a public belief PBw
′
S ϕ, w
′ being
the output context c′ paired with c in DEC(ϕ)↓.
(ii) Quality in interrogatives While Gricean
maxims only cover assertions, (falling) interroga-
tives also come with belief conditions, cf. for in-
stance Searle (1969). Inspired by Gricean quality, I
propose a maxim Q int for interrogative utterances.
Q int Do not doubt what you believe to be true.
“Doubting” in Q int means “use in an interrogative
utterance”, reflecting the intuition that it is infelici-
tous to convey doubt over (in an FI) or ask about (in
a question) something that one actually believes to
be true — thus, ¬BcSϕ holds for interrogatives.
Recall that even when there is evidence for ϕ,
the inference that the speaker believes ϕ does not
go through for the if the blocking condition Bwx ¬ϕ
holds, as blocked inference on the evidence rule re-
peated from (7-c) as (12) shows.
(12) (EV wx ϕ > B
w
x ϕ) ∧Bwx ¬ϕ 0 Bwx ϕ
FIs do not require BwS ¬ϕ to hold, but tolerate it in
contrast to assertions. I propose that adding no to
FIs introduces a condition requiring evidence for the
prejacent in the input context, compatible with an
utterance world w at which BwS ¬ϕ and EV wS ϕ both
hold, giving rise to a belief revision reading.
(iii) Forgone commitment from FIs While FIs
can thus indicate that belief revision is underway,
no speaker commitment arises from them by default.
Furthermore, as assertion is an alternative to FIs,
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they can give rise to a Q-implicature13 in the form
negated public belief ¬PBc′S ϕ as in the CCP below,
conveying that the speaker forgoes commitment to
the prejacent.
(13) JINT(ϕ)↓K = {〈c, c′〉 ∣∣ ¬BcSϕ ∧ ¬PBc′S ϕ}
Negated public belief is defined in (14).
(14) a. ¬PBwx ϕ→ Bwy ¬Bwx ϕ
b. ¬PBwx ϕ→ PBwy ¬Bwx ϕ
As¬PBc′x ϕ is a conversational implicature, it can be
canceled, so that ¬BcSϕ remains the only necessary
condition on FIs. For instance, no-FIs indicate belief
revision and ¬PBc′x ϕ is canceled when the observer
assumes revision is complete.
4 What particles do
I propose to analyze SFPs as paraphrased below.
no adds an input condition requiring evidence sup-
porting ϕ available to both S and A.
ka marks interrogative force in Japanese utterances
(with final falling intonation).14
yo adds an input condition BcS¬BAϕ, and commits
the speaker to PBc
′
Aϕ in the output context.
ne adds an input condition BcSBAϕ.
That is, ka changes force from DEC to INT, introduc-
ing the felicity condition ¬BcSϕ. The effects of no,
yo, and ne on CCPs of FIs and, as a consequence,
speech act felicity conditions are shown below.
4.1 No
As shown in (15), no adds a conditionEV cXϕ requir-
ing evidence for the prejacent in in the input context.
(15) JU(no(ϕ)K = {〈c, c′〉 ∣∣ BU ⊆ c ∧
[EU ∪ EVXϕ] ⊆ c ∧ c′ = c ∪ PBU}
With no, evidence for ϕ must be accessible to not
only the speaker but all participants, written as X .
That no has an evidential meaning has been pro-
posed before, also by Davis (2011), who takes no to
introduce an evidence presupposition. On my anal-
ysis, the evidence condition that no introduces as a
13i.e. a Quantity implicature in the sense of Geurts (2010).
14Final rising utterances without politeness morphology are
ambiguous between declaratives and interrogatives in Japanese.
speech act modifier is of the same type as that re-
quired by QII, so that no makes a relatively small
difference in assertions, only changing the extant ev-
idence condition EV cSϕ to EV
c
Xϕ.
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In the case of (falling) interrogatives, however, no
has a more pronounced effect as they do not have
and evidence condition of their own. In combina-
tion with the belief condition ¬BcSϕ (which toler-
ates Bw¬ϕ in the input context), EV cX characterizes
an utterance situation where the speaker does not be-
lieve ϕ, but there is mutually accessible evidence for
ϕ, giving rise to the incredulity reading.
4.2 Yo
Next, I propose yo modifies both input conditions
and commitment in the CCP as shown in (16).
(16) JU(yo(ϕ)K={〈c, c′〉 ∣∣ [BU ∪BS¬BAϕ] ⊆ c ∧
EU ⊆ c ∧ c′ = c ∪ [PBU ∪ PBSBAϕ]}
Yo introduces two changes: first, it adds an input
condition BcS¬BAϕ, i.e. that the speaker believe the
addressee not to believe ϕ to be true. Second, it adds
an output condition PBc
′
SBAϕ, i.e. speaker commit-
ment to a belief that the addressee believe the preja-
cent to be true. This analysis also accounts for the
“corrective” character of yo-assertions in a similar
way as the update function STRONGASSERT (which
forces addition of ϕ to a context set that already con-
tains ¬ϕ by non-monotonic update) proposed for yo
by McCready (2005), who also suggests an input
condition on the lines of BcS¬BAϕ independently.16
In FIs, this condition is added on top of ¬BcSϕ
from ka (i.e. from INT), which conveys a speaker as-
sumption that neither participant believes the preja-
cent to be true in the input context. Taken together
with commitment arising from yo, this makes a be-
lief revision reading (discussed in more detail in the
next section) and thus an incredulity reading salient.
While the analysis of yo in Davis (2011) is simi-
lar in spirit, my proposal differs in two main points.
First, I do not assume yo gives rise to PBc
′
S ϕ,
i.e. does not commit the speaker, accounting for neg-
15Uses of no-assertions are highly varied and differ rather
subtly from plain assertions, cf. Noda (1997) and Najima (2007)
for extensive discussion. For discussion of how the present
analysis accounts for some properties of no-assertions such as
mirative overtones see Rieser (2017a).
16McCready (2009) modifies this aspect of the analysis.
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atively biased readings of yo-FIs. Second, I do not
take yo to occupy the same spot as final falling in-
tonation, which I take to enter the derivation before
the addition of particles. This is indirectly supported
by the observation that German modal particles have
similar functions as Japanese SFPs17 but do not oc-
cur sentence-finally, which speaks against a shared
position of speech act modifiers and intonation.
4.3 Ne
Finally, I propose ne modifies the CCP by adding a
belief condition to the input context, as (17) shows.
(17) JU(ne(ϕ)K = {〈c, c′〉 ∣∣ [BU ∪BSBAϕ] ⊆ c∧
EU ⊆ c ∧ c′ = c ∪ PBU}
Ne adds only BcSBAϕ, i.e. the speaker is required
to assume that the addressee believe the prejacent
to be true. This accounts for the observation fre-
quently encountered in the descriptive literature that
ne is a consensus-seeking or confirming particle, as
this is predicted in the case of assertion, which also
give rise to speaker commitment. It also straightfor-
wardly accounts for the markedly different effect of
ne in FIs by the combination ofBcSBAϕ with ¬BcSϕ
from ka, indicating discrepant beliefs of speaker and
addressee in the utterance situation (discussed in
more detail in the next section).
It should be noted that there is a compositionality
issue with regard to yo-ne utterances, as assuming
that yo and ne both modify the basic utterance’s fe-
licity conditions at the same time leads to contradic-
tory belief conditions. One way out is to assume, as
for instance Takubo and Kinsui (1997) do, that mod-
ification is sequential. This can be paraphrased as yo
imposing ϕ on the addressee and ne reinforcing this.
As yo adds a commitment PBc
′
SBAϕ, it changes the
context much like a (rising) declarative does. This
makes it plausible that yo performs an update of its
own right, which can then be confirmed with ne. The
present framework is not capable of modeling such
incremental context change and I leave this point for
further research, also as I am not concerned with
combination of yo and ne here. Alternatively, the ob-
servations in Oshima (2014) suggest that yone might
be best analyzed as an independent lexical item.
17As demonstrated in Rieser (2017b), where I analyze doch
and ja as speech-act modifiers in a similar framework.
5 Belief revisions and particles in FIs
The doubt and incredulity readings of bare FIs as
well as versions with particles can be located within
a belief revision process. To illustrate this, I define
DOXx, the doxastic state of agent x, as the set of
worlds compatible with x’s beliefs at a world:
(18) DOXx(w) = {w′
∣∣ wRdoxx w′}
Next, I define three types of doxastic states (DOXα,
DOXβ , DOXγ) by their relation to Wϕ and W¬ϕ.18
(19) a. DOXα ⊆W¬ϕ
b. DOXβ 6⊆W¬ϕ ∧ DOXβ 6⊆Wϕ
c. DOXγ 6⊆Wϕ
An agent in a state of type α thus believes ϕ to be
false, an agent in a state of type γ believes ϕ to be
true. In a state of type β, neither holds — the speaker
considers both ϕ and ¬ϕ possible. The sequence of
doxastic states follows the stages of the belief revi-
sion process illustrated below.
5.1 Schema of belief revision under evidence
The schema below shows revision of Bx¬ϕ to Bxϕ,
i.e.x believes ϕ to be false and revises this belief.
W¬ϕ
DOXα
Wϕ
EVϕ
A
W¬ϕ
DOXγ
Wϕ
EVϕ
B C
W¬ϕ
EVϕ
Wϕ
DOXβ
The shaded area represents evidence for ϕ, which
can motivate belief revision from DOXα. Monotonic
belief update, i.e. narrowing of DOXα to DOXγ is not
possible, as represented by the crossed-out arrow A,
as there are no accessible ϕ-worlds in DOXα. There-
fore, revision requires two steps — first, the DOXα
needs to be widened to DOXβ , represented by arrow
18Note that the subset notation is but a more compact variant,
as for instance DOXα can equivalently be defined as a doxastic
state DOX such that ∀w′.wRdoxw′ : w′ ∈W¬ϕ etc.
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B.19 From the widened DOXβ , narrowing to DOXγ
is possible, as represented by arrow C.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss how the
proposed analysis accounts for the observations on
particles in FIs, making reference to the belief revi-
sion schema where appropriate.
5.2 Doubt and incredulity: no
(20) Tori-ga
birds-NOM
konna
such a
tokoro-ni
place-in
sum-eru
live-POT
(no)
no
ka.
ka
“Can birds live in a place like this!?”/
“Birds can live in a place like this after all!”
The addition of no in (20), repeated from (2), has the
effect of making evidence in support of the prejacent
mandatory in the input context. The bare FI without
no, on the other hand, merely indicates that in the
input context, the speaker does not believe prejacent
ϕ to be true (which corresponds to a doubt reading).
Recall that no marks evidence in principle strong
enough for assertion of ϕ. Thus, only the bare FI
can be used to reject ϕ, while the no-FI typically
receives a belief revision, or incredulity reading.
Bare FIs and doubt In Davis’s doubt scenario,
the speaker rejects accepting a claim by the ad-
dressee. Recall that, according to the analysis pro-
posed above, the following holds for a bare FI.
(21) context before INT(ϕ)↓: ¬BcSϕ
In the belief revision schema, this only excludes
doxastic states of type γ, so that speaker can either
be in a state of type α or type β, i.e. either believe
ϕ to be false be neutral. On the doubt reading as
in Davis’s example, the speaker is in a state of type
α, i.e. believes ϕ to be false so that BwS ¬ϕ holds in
the utterance situation, and either does not consider
belief revision at all as in (non-)step A, or suspends
judgment by widening a state of type α to type β as
in step B. In such cases, the implicature ¬PBc′ϕ
(forgone commitment) arises and the utterance con-
veys that the speaker does not believe ϕ to be true.
Another reading of plain FIs should be mentioned
here. It frequently occurs in soliloquy and conveys
that the speaker is in a process of belief formation
19I gloss over the question of how exactly widening,
i.e. non-monotonic belief update works, seeking only to pre-
dict what FIs and particles convey w.r.t. stages in the schema,
butcf. Ga¨rdenfors (1985) and references therein for discussion.
from a doxastic state of type β based on observed
evidence, corresponding to step C in the schema. In
such cases, no negative bias arises.
Summing up, bare FIs can not convey full belief
revision with both widening and narrowing (steps B
and C), but can convey either individually. Bare FIs
thus do not have belief revision readings like no-FIs.
No-FIs and incredulity In Davis’s incredulity
scenario, the speaker reacts to evidence that has just
come to the her attention, but is in conflict with a
previously held belief. Recall that, according to my
analysis, the following holds for a felicitous no-FI.
(22) context before INT(ϕ)↓: ¬BcSϕ ∧ EV cXϕ
The no-FI thus conveys that the speaker’s doxastic
state is of type α or β, and that there is evidence
for ϕ in principle strong enough for assertion of ϕ.
In such an utterance situation, the speaker must take
either stepB, step C, or both. Note that if the speaker
is in a state of type β, belief formation rather than
revision happens as no widening needs to take place,
as in soliloquous bare FIs mentioned above.
The crucial point to make w.r.t. the bias conveyed
by no in FIs is that bare FIs tend to be negatively
biased as they give rise to ¬PBc′S ϕ, while no-FIs are
positively biased as they indicate that belief revision
is underway, potentially canceling ¬PBc′S ϕ. This
contrast comes out even more sharply with yo, as it
directly adds commitment.
5.3 Shared doubt and incredulity: yo
Yo adds strong addressee orientation, as it conveys a
speaker assumption that the addressee does not be-
lieve the prejacent to be true, but commits the ad-
dressee to it from the speaker’s perspective.
(23) Sonna
such
mono
thing
taberu
eat
(no)
no
ka
ka
yo.
yo
“What the hell! He isn’t going to eat that!”/
“Holy shit! He’s going to eat that!”
In (23), repeated from (4), yo minimally indicates
that the speaker is revising her assumptions about
addressee belief, while the speaker doubts ϕ in the
input context. The utterance thus either conveys
that the speaker is learning that rather than both the
speaker and the addressee doubting ϕ, the addressee
actually believes it to be true, or that a shared belief
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that ϕ is true is in the process of formation, and both
participants share doubt and incredulity. While this
reading is salient in (23), changing the agent of ‘eat’
in (23) to the addressee (“You are going to. . . ”) fore-
grounds the reading on which the speaker revises an
assumption about addressee belief.
For an account in the formal framework, consider
belief conditions on and commitments from yo-FIs.
(24) a. before INT(yo(ϕ))↓: BcS¬BAϕ ∧ ¬BcSϕ
b. after INT(yo(ϕ))↓: PBc′SBAϕ
Revision of the speaker assumption w.r.t. addressee
belief is reflected in the transition from BcS¬BAϕ to
PBc
′
SBAϕ. The second input condition ¬BcSϕ in-
dicates that the speaker assumes both participants
doubt the prejacent. On the purely addressee-
oriented reading, the speaker continues not believ-
ing ϕ, but learns that the addressee believes it. This
is the negatively biased reading of yo-FIs.
When no is added to the yo-FI, evidence support-
ing the prejacent is required in the input context.
In the belief revision schema, this means that step
B and potentially C are taken (i.e. belief revision
is underway) if the speaker believes ϕ to be false
in the utterance situation, and that step C is taken
(i.e. belief formation is underway) if the speaker is
neutral in the input context. In either case, adding
no gives rise to a positively biased reading on which
the speaker accepts, or tends to accept, ϕ, and the
speaker’s belief revision or formation process is mir-
rored by what is assumed regarding addressee belief.
The mirative overtones in the form of surprise
over the prejacent (or the addressee’s belief that the
prejacent holds) are readily explained by the input
conditions, requiring the speaker to assume that nei-
ther participant believes the prejacent to be true.
Also note that where the utterance is interpreted as
indicating full belief revision, the forgone commit-
ment implicature ¬PBc′S ϕ is canceled.
5.4 Doubt and discrepant belief: ne
Utterances with ne are addressee-oriented like those
with yo, but do not indicate any change in speaker
assumptions regarding addressee belief. In asser-
tions, ne signals or seeks agreement, while in FIs is
indicates discrepant belief. The ne-FI (25), repeated
here from (5), is an expression of doubt without, and
one of reluctant acceptance with no.
(25) Sonna
such
mono
thing
taberu
eat
(no)
no
ka
ka
ne.
ne
“So is he actually going to eat this?”/
“So he is actually going to eat this. . . ”
The present analysis predicts the following condi-
tions on and commitments from a ne-FI.
(26) a. before INT(ne(ϕ))↓: BcSBAϕ ∧ ¬BcSϕ
b. after INT(ne(ϕ))↓: PBc′SBAϕ.
In contrast to yo, ne only indirectly gives rise to
PB
′c
SBAϕ by carrying over the input condition
BcSBAϕ. Ne in assertions thus indicates the speaker
is confirming an assumption about addressee belief
rather than attempting to convince the addressee as
with yo. Assertions with ne are consensus seeking
as they give rise to PB
′c
S ϕ, so that adding ne indicat-
ing that BcSϕBAϕ holds indicates that ϕ is a shared
belief. FIs, on the contrary, not only presuppose
¬BcSϕ, but also give rise to the forgone commitment
implicature ¬PB′cS ϕ. Thus, when ne occurs in FIs,
it indicates a persistent discrepancy between speaker
and addressee belief rather than consensus.
The salient reading of ne-FIs without no is inter-
subjective in that the speaker, as in assertions, seeks
to confirm the status of the prejacent as a shared be-
lief with the addressee, but carries strong negative
bias — the goal is to convince the addressee of the
prejacents’ falsity, in sharp contrast with assertions.
Adding no gives rise to a reading on which the
speaker, however reluctantly, considers joining the
addressee in forming a shared belief based on the
available evidence, that is taking step B, step C,
or both. A surprise reading is unlikely as BcSBAϕ
makes it implausible that evidence for ϕ and thus
the possibility that ϕ might be true just came up.
According to the proposed analysis, ne-FIs thus
indicate a discrepancy between speaker and ad-
dressee belief, in stark contrast with assertions. This
is compatible with the perception reported by infor-
mants that ne-FIs have a somewhat arrogant feel,
casting doubt on the correctness of addressee belief,
while ne-assertions, on the contrary, feel friendly.
This is in line with the present proposal, but would
be difficult to capture by encoding either shared be-
lief or a status as old information in terms of hearer-
newness directly into ne’s meaning, as would be in-
dicated by generalizations based on assertions only.
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